- staff_user gains a unique username (both engines: migrate + pg 009); older
rows and the seed owner backfill username=email so every existing login keeps
working. login() matches username OR email (legacy fallback).
- createStaff/createEmployee take an optional username (defaults to email);
Employee/API expose it; POST /employees accepts username. Email stays a
required contact field on the table (making it optional is a later table
rebuild). Full backend suite 346 green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Red-team authorization findings:
- New requireManagerial middleware. Applied to POST /documents/:id/cancel,
/credit-note (financially destructive — reverse money / consume a number)
and /documents/:id/share (mints an UNAUTHENTICATED public PDF link — the
IDOR exfiltration high). Any signed-in staff could previously do all three.
- PATCH /interactions/:id now 403s unless the viewer is the interaction's
author or managerial — staff can no longer overwrite another employee's
logged call/visit.
New authz-gates test locks both. Note (deliberate): general client read/edit
stays open to staff — a shared support-team book is the intended model; the
genuinely sensitive credential reveals are already managerial + rate-limited.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Red-team highs/mediums (auth surface):
- staff_user gains failed_count/locked_until; login() locks an account for 15min
after 8 consecutive failures, clears the counter on success (both engines).
- login() is now constant-time: a missing email still spends one scrypt verify
against a fixed dummy hash — no timing/enumeration oracle. Returns a typed
{ok:false,reason} instead of null.
- POST /auth/login gets per-IP (20/min) AND per-email (8/15min) fixed-window
rate limiting layered over the lockout; 429 on trip.
- Credential reveal routes (db-password, module password, module secret) get a
per-user reveal limiter (20/min) so one insider cannot bulk-decrypt everything;
added missing getClientModule 404 guards.
- app.set(trust proxy,1) so req.ip is the real client behind nginx/Caddy and the
per-IP limiters actually bucket per client.
- makeRateLimiter extracted to rate-limit.ts (shared, no server<->api cycle).
Tests: lockout, counter-reset, unknown-email, and existing auth all green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
P1: every repo, route, scheduler path and test now speaks one async DB
interface (all/get/run/exec/transaction). better-sqlite3 stays underneath
for dev/tests via SqliteDb (statement cache, manual BEGIN/SAVEPOINT
nesting); openDb stays sync so fixtures remain one-liners. Zero behavior
change: 346/346 tests, typecheck clean.
P2: migrations-pg.ts — numbered Postgres migration set (001-init: bigint
paise, integer flags, TEXT ISO dates, TEXT JSON; reminder CHECK born in
final widened form) + schema_migrations runner.
P3: db-pg.ts — pg Pool behind the same interface: ?->$n rewrite outside
string literals, transactions pinned to one pooled client via
AsyncLocalStorage with savepoint nesting, int8/numeric parsed to JS
numbers so paise math is identical on both engines.
Also: reminder upsert INSERT OR IGNORE -> ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING
(portable, same changes-count semantics).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 3 of the quote-to-close funnel spec: client.owner_id added additively
(SCHEMA + PRAGMA-guarded migrate) so a bare lead is routable to an employee;
setClientOwner repo fn (validates active employee, audits set_owner in-txn);
PATCH /clients/:id/owner gated inline to owner/manager; shared ownerScope role
gate (staff forced to self, widening ignored) for later phases; ClientDetail
gains an owner/manager-only Account owner dropdown fed by GET /employees.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Thomas Joise