Red-team highs/mediums (auth surface):
- staff_user gains failed_count/locked_until; login() locks an account for 15min
after 8 consecutive failures, clears the counter on success (both engines).
- login() is now constant-time: a missing email still spends one scrypt verify
against a fixed dummy hash — no timing/enumeration oracle. Returns a typed
{ok:false,reason} instead of null.
- POST /auth/login gets per-IP (20/min) AND per-email (8/15min) fixed-window
rate limiting layered over the lockout; 429 on trip.
- Credential reveal routes (db-password, module password, module secret) get a
per-user reveal limiter (20/min) so one insider cannot bulk-decrypt everything;
added missing getClientModule 404 guards.
- app.set(trust proxy,1) so req.ip is the real client behind nginx/Caddy and the
per-IP limiters actually bucket per client.
- makeRateLimiter extracted to rate-limit.ts (shared, no server<->api cycle).
Tests: lockout, counter-reset, unknown-email, and existing auth all green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
P1: every repo, route, scheduler path and test now speaks one async DB
interface (all/get/run/exec/transaction). better-sqlite3 stays underneath
for dev/tests via SqliteDb (statement cache, manual BEGIN/SAVEPOINT
nesting); openDb stays sync so fixtures remain one-liners. Zero behavior
change: 346/346 tests, typecheck clean.
P2: migrations-pg.ts — numbered Postgres migration set (001-init: bigint
paise, integer flags, TEXT ISO dates, TEXT JSON; reminder CHECK born in
final widened form) + schema_migrations runner.
P3: db-pg.ts — pg Pool behind the same interface: ?->$n rewrite outside
string literals, transactions pinned to one pooled client via
AsyncLocalStorage with savepoint nesting, int8/numeric parsed to JS
numbers so paise math is identical on both engines.
Also: reminder upsert INSERT OR IGNORE -> ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING
(portable, same changes-count semantics).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review findings on the Phase 1-2 employee slice:
- setEmployeePassword now deletes the employee's sessions in the same
transaction — resetting a suspected-compromised password must not leave
the attacker's existing 14-day bearer token valid (deactivateEmployee
already did this; the reset path is the natural lockout action).
- updateEmployee throws 'Nothing to update' when the patch resolves to
zero recognized fields, instead of returning 200 and writing a no-op
before==after audit row; PATCH /employees/:id with {} or wrongly-typed
fields now 400s.
- createEmployee pre-checks UNIQUE(email) inside the transaction and
throws 'Email already in use' instead of surfacing the raw
engine-specific 'UNIQUE constraint failed: staff_user.email' text
(would differ on Postgres, the locked production engine — D15).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2 of the quote-to-close funnel slice. Six /employees routes in
apps/hq/src/api.ts (GET requireAuth for the picker; POST/PATCH/deactivate/
reactivate/password owner-only, acting as the signed-in user); Employees
page (table + add/edit/reset-password forms, email immutable on edit,
count shown, no truncation); owner-only nav item beside Document Template;
typed client fns in hq-web api.ts. 6 new route tests (192 total).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Thomas Joise